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ABSTRACT  
   
Recommendations made by expert groups are pervasive throughout various life 
domains.  Yet not all recommendations—or expert groups—are equally 
persuasive.  This research aims to identify factors that influence the 
persuasiveness of recommendations.  More specifically, this study examined the 
effects of decisional cohesion (the amount of agreement among the experts in 
support of the recommendation), framing (whether the message is framed as a 
loss or gain), and the domain of the recommendation (health vs. financial) on the 
persuasiveness of the recommendation.  The participants consisted of 1,981 
undergraduates from Arizona State University.  The participants read a vignette 
including information about the expert group making a recommendation—which 
varied the amount of expert agreement for the recommendation—and the 
recommendation, which was framed as either a gain or loss.  Participants then 
responded to questions about the persuasiveness of the recommendation.  In this 
study, there was a linear main effect of decisional cohesion such that the greater 
the decisional cohesion of the expert group the more persuasive their 
recommendation.  In addition, there was a main effect of domain such that the 
health recommendation was more persuasive than the financial recommendation.  
Contrary to predictions, there was no observed interaction between the amount of 
decisional cohesion and the framing of the recommendation nor was there a main 
effect of framing.  Further analyses show support for a mediation effect indicating 
that high levels of decisional cohesion increased the perceived entitativity of the 
expert group—the degree to which the group was perceived as a unified, cohesive 
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group—which increased the recommendation’s persuasiveness.  An implication 
of this research is that policy makers could increase the persuasiveness of their 
recommendations by promoting recommendations that are unanimously supported 
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  Each year countless recommendations are made to the general public by 
expert groups.  For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) is an organization of health experts who work toward promoting health 
and preventing disease (CDC, 2012).  As part of their mission, in 2011 they made 
numerous recommendations regarding health and wellness, including 
recommending getting a flu vaccine each year as the “first and most important 
step in protecting against flu viruses” (CDC, 2011).  As another example, the 
American Cancer Society is governed by a board of directors who vote on 
recommendations and policies they endorse based on information gathered from 
experts (American Cancer Society, 2012a).  They have been active in making 
recommendations regarding the prevention of skin cancer including 
recommending “sun safe behaviors” such as limiting the amount of time spent in 
the sun, wearing protective clothing, and wearing a sunscreen with a sun 
protection factor of fifteen or higher (American Cancer Society, 2012b).   
 Although the health domain offers many examples, other domains of life 
also come with their own set of expert recommendations.  Each year, the 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety and the Highway Loss Data Institute 
jointly announce their “Top Safety Picks” based on a number of crash tests and 
evaluations of safety restraints (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety & 
Highway Loss Data Institute, 2012).  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration makes recommendations regarding car seats and booster seats for 
young children (NHTSA, 2011).  In the controversial debate regarding global 
warming, 97 of the top 100 climate researchers—who 
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global warming—explicitly agree with or endorse the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s assessment of global warming including their recommendations 
(EurekAlert!, 2010).  Furthermore, a listing of recommendations would be 
incomplete without mentioning the countless iterations of the classic sugarless 
gum commercial which states, “sugarless gum is recommended by four out of five 
dentists . . .”  
 These are all examples of recommendations made by expert groups and 
organizations who have reviewed products and practices relevant to their area of 
expertise.  These recommendations encompass nearly every aspect of life: health, 
diet, exercise, the products we buy, safety for our children and ourselves, 
politically driven issues, how much sleep we should get, and so on.  
Recommendations of this sort are pervasive and beneficial to the recipient.  They 
offer recipients valuable information regarding “best” practices.  If you want to 
know what the safest car is, who better to ask than a group of safety experts?  If 
you want to know whether to get a flu shot, who is a better source on the subject 
than the CDC?  Expert group recommendations provide a quick way for people to 
receive valuable information.   
 Recommendations are also a unique source compared to other ways of 
receiving information.  They provide a conclusion regarding a “best” option often 
without making lengthy arguments or delving into potentially highly technical and 
complicated information.  Instead, recipients infer the reasonableness of the 
recommendation based primarily on their understanding of the source of the 
recommendation and the minimal information which is contained in the actual 
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recommendation.  Since recommendations provide limited information, they 
present an interesting context in which to examine decision making in the absence 
of content rich information and persuasive arguments—as are frequently studied 
in the literature.  They are also prime candidates for study because of the serious 
content of many of the recommendations, their ripeness for multiple heuristic 
cues, and naturally arising framing issues.   
 One important nuance of a recommendation is whether it includes 
information about the degree to which experts agree on the recommendation.  For 
example, the gum commercial states, “sugarless gum is recommended by four out 
of five dentists.”  Likewise, in the provided climate change example, 97 out of 
100 experts agreed.  In each of these, information about the amount of agreement, 
or support for, the recommendation is provided.  Although in these examples the 
amount of agreement is fairly high, it is also conceivable that a recommendation 
might be made even if there is barely a majority of experts, such as six out of ten, 
who agree.  The differences in the amount of expert agreement, what I will refer 
to as decisional cohesion, could have important implications for the 
persuasiveness of a recommendation yet little, if any, research has examined its 
effect.   
 The framing of the message is another nuance commonly varied in 
recommendations.  Like any message, recommendations can be framed in a way 
that focuses on the benefits of following the recommendation or on the negative 
outcomes of not following the recommendation.  For example, the CDC in its 
recommendation chose to focus on the potential loss and stated that the flu shot 
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was useful in “protecting against flu viruses.”  Here the emphasis is on the 
negative outcome associated with not following the recommendation: getting the 
flu.  The same message could be framed as a means of “encouraging health.”  In 
this instance, the message is focused on the positive outcome of staying healthy if 
you obtain the flu shot.  Research has shown that differences in framing impact 
how people think about risks and how they respond to a message (i.e., Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; 1982; 1984).  By examining the interaction of decisional 
cohesion and framing, which has a demonstrated influence specifically on the 
persuasiveness of recommendations (e.g., Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & 
Rothman, 1999; Gerend & Cullen, 2008; Hevey, Pertl, Thomas, Maher, Craig, & 
Chuinneagain, 2010; McCall & Martin Ginis, 2004; Updegraff, Emanuel, 
Gallagher, & Steinman, 2011), we can provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the influence of heuristics on a recommendation’s persuasiveness. 
This study examines the effects of decisional cohesion, framing, and their 
interaction on the persuasiveness of recommendations in multiple domains.  In the 
literature review, I will discuss three relevant areas of literature that help elucidate 
how recipients might be influenced by these types of recommendations.  First, I 
will discuss the “expert” heuristic and how expert groups generally influence the 
persuasiveness of recommendations.  Second, I will discuss the theorized 
influence of decisional cohesion and briefly review the literature on the influence 
of social consensus and the literature on entitativity and persuasion to support my 
predictions.  Third, I will review the framing literature and discuss implications 
for the way this may interact with decisional cohesion.  Following a review of the 
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literature, I will describe my thesis study examining the influence of the degree of 
decisional cohesion among the expert group making a recommendation and the 
framing of the recommendation on its persuasiveness in two domains.  In 
conclusion, I will discuss the results of this study in relation to specific 
hypotheses as well as report the results of some exploratory analyses, limitations 
of the study, potential future directions of research, and the implications of this 
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THE “EXPERT” HEURISTIC 
     Experts function largely as credible authorities, and as Cialdini (2009) 
put it, authority is one of the top six “weapons of influence.”  Some even argue 
that the effects of obedience observed in the classic Milgram Study resulted not 
only from the perceived legitimacy of the authority, but also from the authority 
derived from the perceived expertise of the experimenter (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004).  Authorities and experts are strong, often overlapping figures of influence.  
Thus it is only necessary to evoke symbols of authority, such as the title ‘Doctor’ 
or a well tailored business suit, to influence an individual (Cialdini & Trost, 
1998).  Additionally, a review of the literature surmised that those high in 
expertise are more persuasive than low-expertise sources and that high expertise 
elicited more change in attitudes and had a stronger influence on behavioral 
compliance (Pornpitakpan, 2004). 
 There is evidence that the perceived expertise of the message deliverer 
functions as an “expert” heuristic influencing the perceptions of the message.  For 
example, when a message was delivered by an expert source, rather than an 
attractive source, participants used more heuristic based processing of the 
message (DeBono & Harnish, 1988).  Heuristics, or mental short-cuts based on 
simple hard-and-fast rules, allow the recipient to use generalized knowledge from 
past experiences, observations, and intuitions to form attitudes rather than relying 
on a content based analysis of the issue.  According to research, there is a 
collective presumption that expert statements are inherently valid which is what 
creates the “expert” heuristic (Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002).  Thus, statements 
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from experts are perceived as more valid and are consequently more persuasive.  
The perceived expertise of the source can be even more influential than the 
strength of the presented arguments.  One study found that when personal 
relevance was low and participants were using heuristic processing, attitudes were 
influenced primarily by the expertise of the source rather than by the strength of 
the arguments presented (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981).     
    Although the “expert” heuristic is well documented, research has largely 
failed to exam the influence of groups of experts (Pronpitakpan, 2004).  If a single 
expert has influential abilities, then it is reasonable that a group or organization of 
experts would exert even more influence.  A recent study by Votruba and Kwan 
(2012) examined the relative influence of a recommendation from an organization 
of experts compared to an individual expert.  The study created recommendations 
from individual experts and organizations of experts with varying degrees of 
relevant expertise and measured the participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness 
of the pharmaceutical drug being recommended.  The results of the study showed 
that drugs endorsed by organizations of experts, regardless of their relevant 
expertise, were perceived as more effective than drugs endorsed by individual 
experts.  Thus, expert groups have even more persuasive influence than individual 
experts.   
  When information is provided about the expert group making a 
recommendation, the “expert” heuristic is likely to be influential.  This heuristic is 
made stronger because recommendations are typically made by a group of 
experts, rather than an individual expert.  Thus, given the limited information 
  8 
provided in most recommendations, the strength of the “expert” heuristic, and the 
compounding of having multiple experts supporting the recommendation, this 
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DECISIONAL COHESION 
 Although recommendations from expert groups are likely to be highly 
persuasive, a unique scenario can occur in which the group of experts is not in 
complete agreement regarding a recommendation.  In fact, it is not uncommon for 
experts to disagree.  For example, many medical advertisements support their 
product or practice by stating something similar to “4 out of 5 doctors agree . . .”  
In the example provided in the introduction, the report stated 97 out of the top 100 
climate researchers agreed, showing that there is at least some disagreement 
among experts (EurekAlert!, 2010).  The decisional cohesion of a group, the 
amount of agreement regarding the group’s endorsement, can vary.  It is even 
possible that a recommendation could be supported by barely a majority such as 3 
out of 5 doctors, or only 51 out of 100 scientists.  In these cases a majority of 
experts still agree with the recommendation but agreement is far from unanimous; 
the decisional cohesion lacks complete agreement.  Are recommendations from 
expert groups less persuasive when the group is not in complete agreement, even 
though there may still be a majority who favor the recommendation?  Although 
no research thus far directly answers this question, the literature on social 
consensus and the literature on entitativity offer some insight.  The following 
sections will review the relevant literature and outline the implications for the 
persuasiveness of expert group recommendations. 
Social Consensus and Persuasion  
 Social influence is a long demonstrated psychological phenomenon which 
is famously highlighted in the Asch experiments (e.g., Asch, 1955).  Social 
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influence research has examined the persuasive influence of informing a recipient 
about the amount of social consensus on an issue.  Research supports the theory 
that a consensus heuristic operates such that the more agreement there is for one 
side of an issue the more valid that position seems to the perceiver (Mackie, 
1987).  This leads to acceptance of the majority position and can induce 
significant attitude change.  Mackie’s study manipulated consensus surrounding a 
position by presenting students at a university with information that an 82% 
majority of students favored one side of an issue and that an 18% minority of 
students favored the other.  When the peer based social consensus information 
was provided in the absence of additional persuasive arguments, recipients rated 
agreement with the majority view as more accurate, they were able to generate 
more arguments supporting a majority view, and they showed attitude change in 
the direction of adopting the majority view.  
 Other researchers have also examined the role of consensus on the 
processing and effectiveness of a persuasive message.  One team theorized that 
information about the mere consensus on an issue could influence how a recipient 
felt about a message (Erb, Bohner, Schmalzle, & Rank, 1998).  Based on their 
theory, high consensus leads to more favorable thinking which, in turn, affects the 
persuasiveness of the message.  They manipulated social consensus by telling 
recipients, “In a public discussion meeting on this large scale-project, a majority 
[minority] of about 85% [15%] of participants agreed with the construction 
project.” The study also included a condition in which no information on social 
consensus was provided.  Results showed that when consensus information was 
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present, systematic processing—thoughtful scrutiny of issue-relevant information 
to reach a conclusion—decreased and heuristic processing—reliance on 
associations and other non-content cues in deciding to accept a conclusion—
dominated.  The study also found that high consensus information evoked more 
positive thoughts on the issue than low consensus information resulting in higher 
agreement with the attitude measures. Messages supported by low consensus 
evoked more negative thoughts and were less persuasive compared to messages 
supported by high consensus.  
  Another group of researchers examined whether information regarding 
social consensus was still influential even when the “polling” consisted of a 
relatively small sample (Darke et al., 1998).  The study manipulated the amount 
of social consensus of a peer student group, 80% majority in favor of or against 
comprehensive senior exams.  It also manipulated the size of the poll, whether 
1,000 or ten students were polled.  The results showed that when motivation was 
low—when heuristic processing is primarily used—participants were influenced 
by the level of consensus even when the consensus information was based on a 
relatively small polling. 
 Although a number of parallels can be inferred between social consensus 
and expert group decisional cohesion, it is important to point out two key 
distinctions.  First, social consensus generally refers to consensus in the general 
public or the recipient’s peers.  In the studies discussed, social consensus was 
typically manipulated by providing information based on polling from these types 
of lay groups.  In contrast, decisional cohesion references agreement among 
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members of expert groups such as the CDC or other prominent advisory 
institutions.  These members are experts and are distinct from peers or the general 
public because they have specialized knowledge about the topic of interest.  It is 
the distinction between using the results of a public opinion poll and referencing 
the CDC to determine how best to prevent getting the flu.  Second, social 
consensus, as generally operationalized, is focused on the distinction between 
majorities and minorities (e.g., Darke et al., 1998; Erb, Bohner, Schmalzle, & 
Rank, 1998).  In the discussed studies, recipients were provided information 
worded to include the term “majority” or “minority” and were then provided with 
a specific percentage of people that supported this indication, somewhere around 
80% for the majority.  In the case of recommendations, the expert group 
endorsing the recommendation will always have a majority in favor of the 
recommendation or else the recommendation would not be made.  Thus, when 
discussing decisional cohesion, the recommendation is always supported by a 
majority of the experts.  The distinction is whether there is barely a majority, say 
6 out of 10 supporting the recommendation, or whether there is a larger majority 
such as 10 out of 10 experts supporting the recommendation.  
 Group Entitativity and Persuasion 
 Entitativity is an important factor when examining the perceptions and 
persuasiveness of groups.  Campbell (1958) originally coined the term entitativity.  
He defined it as “the degree of being entitative.  The degree of having the nature 
of an entity, of having real existence” (Campbell, 1958, p. 17).  Researchers have 
since further defined the term as the “degree to which a collection of individuals 
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is perceived to be bonded together to form a coherent group” (Clark & Wegener, 
2009, p. 42).  Groups high in entitativity are perceived as more united and as 
representing a singular unit compared to groups lower in entitativity.  
Components of entitativity include: the similarity and proximity of members, the 
organization of the various elements, the interdependence of the members, and 
expectations of behavioral consistency (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997).     
 Clark and Wegener (2009) examined the influence of group entitativity on 
persuasion and extended prior research by examining the effects of pro-attitudinal 
and counter-attitudinal arguments.  They theorized that high-entitativity groups, 
groups that are more cohesive, are perceived as more organized and more likely to 
bring about future outcomes.  Thus, when high-entitativity groups endorse a 
favorable position, processing is less in depth resulting in more superficial and 
heuristic based decision making.  Recipients focused less on argument strength 
and instead focused on heuristics, resulting in thinking more favorably about the 
message.  In contrast, when low-entitativity groups endorse a favorable position 
processing becomes more in depth and less heuristically driven.  This was 
theorized to be the result of concerns that the group would be ineffective at 
promoting the preferred position resulting in greater reliance on argument 
strength.  The results of their studies supported this theory. 
 Decisional cohesion may influence perception of entitativity and cue the 
cohesiveness of the group.  Expert groups that are high in decisional cohesion will 
be viewed as more of a unified, singular unit ultimately making their 
recommendations more persuasive and eliciting more behavioral change.  In 
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contrast, groups low in decisional cohesion cue low levels of entitativity and 
consequently low organizational ability thus weakening the overall persuasiveness 
of their recommendations.  Thus, perceived entitativity may mediate the 
relationship between the decisional cohesion of the expert group and the 
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FRAMING EFFECTS 
  In addition to the decisional cohesion, the framing of the language of a 
recommendation may influence its persuasiveness.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, the CDC’s recommendation states that getting a flu vaccine is “the 
first and most important step in protecting against flu viruses” (CDC, 2011).  
There are other ways the CDC could have stated the recommendation.  For 
example, they could have said “the first and most important step in maintaining 
your health.”  This wording focuses on what the benefits of getting a flu vaccine, 
staying healthy, rather than potential negative consequence of not getting the 
vaccine, getting sick with the flu.  This example outlines one systematic way that 
the framing of persuasive messages can vary.  As originally worded, the CDC 
recommendation focused on the loss, getting sick, but they could have also chosen 
to highlight the gain, being healthy.  Using a skin cancer example, a gain framed 
recommendation could read, “Use sunscreen to help your skin look healthy.”  In 
contrast, a loss framed recommendation might read, “Without sunscreen you 
increase your risk of skin damage.”   
 The influence of message framing was first explored by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979; 1982; 1984) when they proposed the highly influential Prospect 
Theory.  Based on Prospect Theory and supported by their research, framing 
effects occur when objectively equivalent alternatives are evaluated in relation to 
different reference points.  In general, when presented with mathematically 
equivalent risky and certain options, people have a bias towards being risk 
adverse when a situation is framed as a gain and risk seeking when the identical 
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situation is framed as a loss.  When presented with two options that both 
emphasize potential gains, people tend to choose the less risky option.  For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) told participants to imagine the U.S. was 
preparing for the outbreak of a disease that was expected to kill 600 people.  
Participants who received the gain frame were given a decision problem and 
asked to choose between two alternative programs: (1) Program A, where 200 
people will be saved and (2) Program B, where there is a one-third probability 
that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be 
saved.  Because these options were gain framed, focused on saving lives, 
participants were risk adverse and 72% chose Program A, the program that was 
certain to save 200 people.   
 In contrast, when the same problem was presented as a loss frame, the two 
alternative programs were: (1) Program C, where 400 people will die and (2) 
Program D, where there is a one-third probability that no one will die and a two-
thirds probability that 600 people will die.  These programs substituted the 
number of people who would die for the number who would be saved in 
corresponding proportions.  Participants were risk seeking and 78% choose the 
riskier Program D.  Tversky and Kahneman (1981)  also found that the value 
function, on which Prospect Theory is based, is steeper for losses than gains 
indicating that “losses loom larger than gains” (p. 456).  The threat of a loss has a 
stronger impact on an individual’s decision making than the prospect of an 
equivalent gain.  For example, consumers are more willing to forego a discount 
than accept a surcharge even when the value is equivalent. 
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 Like the decision problems in Kahneman and Tversky’s work, 
recommendations can be framed as either gains or losses.  Recommendations can 
focus on the potential benefits of their proposed behavior and thus be framed as a 
gain.  For example, a recommendation asking a recipient to wear sunscreen could 
focus on having “healthy skin.”  Recommendations can also be loss framed and 
focus on the proposed negative consequences of none adherence.  Rather than 
focusing on healthy skin, the same recommendation could highlight using 
sunscreen to “prevent skin damage.”  The framing of recommendations could 
affect their influential abilities in predictable ways depending on the risks 
involved.   
 To understand the influence of framing on recommendations, it is 
important to know the potential risk associated with the recommendation.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s work focused on certainty or a lack of certainty, as an 
operationalization of the level risk.  For recommendations, it will be the 
recipient’s perception of recommendation accuracy that influences the perceived 
risk involved in adhering to the recommendation.  Decisional cohesion could act 
as a cue to the level of certainty of the accuracy of a recommendation and in so 
doing influence the perceived risk involved in adhering to the recommendation.  
Based on this idea a number of predictions can be made.  First, as noted by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) “losses loom larger than gains.”  This means 
people will be less willing to accept having damaged skin by not wearing 
sunscreen than they are willing to forego having healthy skin.  Therefore, loss 
framed recommendations should be more persuasive because people are less 
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willing to accept a loss than they are willing to forego a gain.  In addition, when 
there is low decisional cohesion people are going to be especially unwilling to 
take further risk.  Thus, loss framed messages should be even more persuasive 
than gain framed messages when decisional cohesion is low.  It is important to 
note that recommendations are different from the decision problems used in 
Kahneman and Tversky’s studies, and they offer an opportunity to extend their 
work.  When evaluating the persuasiveness of a recommendation, the recipient 
will only see one version of the recommendation and they will answer questions 
regarding persuasiveness rather than choosing between two options.  This study 
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CURRENT STUDY 
 This thesis study is a systematic examination of the persuasiveness of 
expert group recommendations like those found in everyday life.  More 
specifically, this study asks the following questions.  How does the decisional 
cohesion of the expert group making a recommendation and the framing of the 
recommendation affect its persuasiveness?  Is a recommendation supported by 6 
out of 10 experts less persuasive than one supported by 10 out of 10 experts?  Do 
the effects of having something framed as a gain versus a loss differ based on the 
amount of decisional cohesion?  In this study I manipulated the amount of 
decisional cohesion and the framing of the recommendation to answer these 
questions.  Decisional cohesion was manipulated using 5 levels: (1) 10 out of 10 
expert agreement, (2) 9 out of 10 expert agreement, (3) 8 out of 10 expert 
agreement, (4) 7 out of 10 expert agreement, and (5) 6 out of 10 expert agreement.  
Framing was manipulated by framing the recommendation as either a loss or gain.    
 The study also manipulated the domain of the recommendation such that 
there are two different vignettes each encompassing a different domain of 
common decisions making.  One involved a health recommendation and the other 
a financial recommendation.  The domain is manipulated to test whether the effect 
is sensitive to the content of the recommendation.  In all, this study consists of a 5 
(decisional cohesion) x 2 (frame) x 2 (domain) between-subjects design.  
Hypotheses 
 A number of hypotheses regarding this study can be derived from a 
synthesis of the literature surrounding the “expert” heuristic, social consensus, 
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entitativity, and framing effects.  I will first discuss a series of hypotheses best 
supported by the literature.  Then I will discuss an alternative hypothesis.   
 Main Hypotheses. First, I predicted that there would be an interaction 
between framing and decisional cohesion such that the discounting for the gain 
framed recommendations between high and low decisional cohesion would be 
significantly larger than for the loss framed recommendation.  According to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) “losses loom larger than gains.”  Therefore 
participants will be more motivated to follow the recommendation when the 
framing highlights the potential loss rather than the potential gain. Thus loss 
framed recommendations should be overall more persuasive.  But, when there is 
low decisional cohesion, the difference between the loss framed and gain framed 
messages will be significantly larger than when there is high decisional cohesion.  
Since decisional cohesion is low, participants in the gain framed condition will be 
far less likely to take a risk compared to those in the loss framed condition.  Thus 
the gain framed recommendation will be even less persuasive when decisional 
cohesion is low.  Those in the loss framed condition are more likely to take a risk 
and follow the recommendation to mitigate the highlighted loss.  Since 
participants in the loss framed conditions are far more willing to take risks the 
difference between the high and low decisional cohesion is smaller than in the 
gain framed conditions.   
 Second, there will be an overarching main effect of decisional cohesion, 
such that recommendations from expert groups with higher decisional cohesion 
will be more persuasive than those with low decisional cohesion.  
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Recommendations supported by 10 out of 10 experts will be more persuasive than 
recommendations supported by only 6 out of 10 experts.  Decisional cohesion will 
function as a heuristic cue for the recipients.  If a greater proportion of experts 
support a recommendation, then as theorized, the recommendation will be more 
persuasive. 
 Third, there should be no observed difference between the two domains.  
The research on social consensus, entitativity, and framing effects has shown 
pervasive effects in multiple domains.  Thus there is limited reason to suspect that 
the influence of decisional cohesion and framing should not generalize to multiple 
domains.   
 Finally, I predict that the perceived entitativity of the expert group will 
mediate the relationship between the decisional cohesion of the expert group and 
the persuasiveness of the recommendation.  High decisional cohesion should 
increase the perceived entitativity of the expert group which will increase the 
persuasiveness of the recommendation.  Likewise, when decisional cohesion is 
low, there will be lower perceived entitativity thus decreasing the persuasiveness 
of the recommendation.  
 Alternative Hypothesis.  One alternative hypothesis is that a main effect 
of domain exists and differences will be observed in the results between the health 
domain and the financial domain.  One possible reason for differences could be 
the relative severity of the harm the recommendation is intended to prevent.  
Harm related to a recipient’s health may be viewed as more serious than financial 
harm, thus influencing the recipient’s perceptions of the recommendation.  A 
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main effect of domain would only reflect a difference between the perceived 
relative harm and will have no effect on the other hypotheses. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
 This study was part of the PGS 101 Questionnaire administered at the start 
of the fall 2012 semester.  The PGS 101 Questionnaire was taken by 2203 
participants.  Of those, 1,981 completed this study.1 Examining the gender of 
these participants, 54.0% were female and 45.6% were male (8 participants did 
not indicate their gender).  The average age was 19.19 years old (3 participants 
did not indicate their age and one participant incorrectly answered the question 
with his student ID number therefore his response was removed from the age 
analysis).  The ethnic breakdown of the participants consisted of: 64.3% 
White/Caucasian, 3.6% Black/African-American, 14.8% Hispanic/Latino, 1.0% 
Native American, 5.8% East Asian, 1.5% South Asian, 0.4% Southeast Asian, 
3.1% Asian-American, 1.3% Middle Eastern, 0.6% Arab/Arab-American, and 
3.4% chose the “other” category (6 participants did not indicate an ethnicity).  
Participants received course credit for completing the questionnaire.   
Design  
 This study consisted of a 5 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design with three 
factors:  decisional cohesion, framing, and domain.  The decisional cohesion 
factor includes five levels from high decisional cohesion among the experts 
making the recommendation to low decisional cohesion using the following 
                                                        
1
 The 222 missing participants were the result of a programming issue in one version of the PGS 
101 questionnaire.  The error resulted in the participants skipping the entire rest of the 
questionnaire—including this study—after another a previous set of measures.  This error was 
caught after only a short period of time.  It did not affect the participant’s assignment to conditions 
because random assignment occurred in every version of the PGS 101 questionnaire and took 
place after the participants read the directions of this study.  Therefore, the only effect is the 
reduction in the number of participants. 
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wording: “10 out of 10,” “9 out of 10,” “8 out of 10,” “7 out of 10,” and “6 out of 
10”.  Framing consists of two levels, gain framed and loss framed, and domain 
also consists of two levels, a health domain recommendation and a financial 
domain recommendation.  It is important to note that framing can be manipulated 
a number of different ways.  For example, framing can focus on the behavioral 
action (attaining versus not attaining a desired behavior), on the outcome of the 
behavior (desirable outcome such as staying health versus an undesirable outcome 
such as having cancer), or a combination of the two (Detweiler, Bedell, Pronin, & 
Rothman, 1999).  In this study, framing was manipulated by focusing on the 
desirability of the outcome. 
Materials 
 Appendix A contains the materials provided to the participants.  Prior to 
receiving any study materials, the participants read these directions: “Various 
organizations are frequently making recommendations to the public.  We are 
interested in evaluating your perceptions of these types of recommendations.  The 
following provides some information about an organization and its 
recommendation.  Please read the provided information and then answer the 
questions that follow.”  After reading the directions, the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of twenty conditions.  Each version of the study is 
described in the following sections, organized by the domain of the vignette. 
 Health domain.  After having read the directions, the participant then 
received information providing them with background on the organization making 
the recommendation.  This initial paragraph is where the decisional cohesion 
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factor was manipulated.  Those in the high decisional cohesion conditions read, 
“An organization of health experts has made a recommendation to the public.  
The organization set up a panel of 10 experts to review the relevant research on 
the issue and vote in order to determine their recommendations.  The following is 
their current recommendation which 10 out of 10 of the experts voted in favor of: 
. . .”  For the other decisional cohesion conditions, only the language in italics 
differed stating either  “9 out of 10,” “8 out of 10,” “7 out of 10,” or “6 out of 10”.   
 After having reviewed the paragraph introducing the expert group making 
the recommendation, the participants then read the recommendations.  The gain 
framed health recommendation read, “Our group of experts recommends reducing 
your consumption of sugar sweetened beverages, such as soda, to maintain a 
healthy weight.”  Those in the loss framed recommendation conditions read a 
similar recommendation, but the final words in italics read “prevent an unhealthy 
weight.” 
 Financial domain.  The financial vignette followed an identical format to 
the health vignette.  After having read the directions, the participant in the 
financial domain then received the same paragraph of information in which the 
decisional cohesion factor is manipulated.  The only change is that the experts 
referred to in the first sentence of the paragraph were financial experts instead of 
health experts.  Otherwise the decisional cohesion manipulations were identical.  
After having reviewed the paragraph introducing the recommendation and the 
expert group making the recommendation, the participants then read the financial 
recommendation.  Participants in the gain framed recommendation conditions 
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read the following recommendation, “Our group of experts recommends that 
college students acquire one, and only one, national credit card and continually 
pay the full balance each month to build good credit.”  Participants in the loss 
framed conditions received a similar recommendation, with only the italicized 
portion of the recommendation changed to read “prevent bad credit.” 
 Dependent measures.  All of the dependent measures are reproduced in 
Appendix B including the Likert scales that were used for each measure.  The 
dependent measures include: (1) persuasiveness measures that were combined 
into a composite for analyses; (2) an entitativity measure; (3) a behavioral 
intentions measure; (4) a measure of perceived accuracy of the recommendation; 
(5) information seeking measures; (6) a manipulation check; and (7) a series of 
standard demographic questions. 
 Persuasion measures.  After having read one of twenty randomly 
assigned vignettes including a description of the expert organization and its 
recommendation, a series of questions measured the persuasiveness of the 
recommendation including a direct question about persuasiveness and two 
questions that in combination represent perceptions of credibility.  The attitude 
question directly measuring perceived persuasiveness read, “How persuasive was 
this recommendation?” (rated on a scale of 1= very unpersuasive to 7 = very 
persuasive).  In order to garner a more complete understanding of the influence of 
the manipulations on the perception of the recommendation, the perceived 
credibility of the organization making the recommendation was also measured.  
According to the literature on authority, the perceived credibility of an authority is 
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strongly linked with perceptions of trust and expertise (Pornpitakpan, 2004).  
Therefore measures of both trust and expertise were included.  For both measures, 
respondents were asked to “Please indicate your level of agreement with the 
following statement: . . .”  Then they read the expertise statement, “The group 
making this recommendation is an expert on the topic,” and were asked to 
indicate their agreement with the statement on a scale of 1= Strongly Disagree to 
7 = Strongly Agree.  Directly following the expertise statement was the trust 
statement, “The group making this recommendation is trustworthy.”  The 
participant then rated this statement using the same scale. 
 In order to create a composite measure of the persuasiveness of the 
recommendation, I averaged these three measures.  I examined the intraclass 
correlations between the items to ascertain whether they measured the same 
underlying concept of persuasiveness and determined if they were internally 
consistent.  The correlations were high and Cronbach’s alpha was .754.  See Table 
1 in Appendix C for the correlations of the measures. 
 Entitativity measure.  As hypothesized, the perceived entitativity of the 
expert group making the recommendation should mediate the effect of decisional 
cohesion on persuasiveness.  Therefore a measure of entitativity was included 
prior to the persuasiveness measures.  Modeled after a single question measure of 
entitativity used by Clark & Wegener (2009), participants were asked, “To what 
extent do the experts deciding on the recommendation qualify as a cohesive, 
unified group?”  The response options ranged from 1 = Not Really a Group to 7 = 
Very Much so a Group.   
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 Behavioral intent measure.  In order to measure the behavioral intentions 
of the participants, the participants were asked, “How likely are you to start 
following the recommendation?”  The response scale ranged from 1 = Very 
Unlikely to 7 = Very Likely. 
 Additional exploratory measures.  Participants were given a number of 
additional measures for exploratory analyses including a measure of perceived 
accuracy of the recommendation, a measure regarding information seeking 
intentions, and they were asked to rate various reasons for seeking additional 
information.  To measure the perceived accuracy of the recommendation, 
participants were asked, “How accurate do you believe this recommendation is?” 
(rated on a scale of 1= not very accurate to 7 = very accurate).  Participants were 
also asked, “How likely are you to seek additional information about this 
recommendation?” (rated on a scale of 1 = Very Unlikely to 7 = Very Likely).  
Following this question, participants were then asked to “Please rate the following 
reasons for why you would seek additional information about the 
recommendation: . . .” which was followed by four statements, “I want to learn 
more about the research behind the recommendation,”  “I do not trust the 
recommendation by this organization of experts,” “There might be exceptions to 
the general rule, which I would like to know about,” and “There might be other 
options that I would prefer to use.”  Participants rated their agreement with each 
of these statements on a scale of 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree.   
 Manipulation check measure. To check that the decisional cohesion 
manipulation was retained by the participants, after answering each of the above 
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measures they then answered an objective question intended to measure their 
memory of the manipulation.  Participants were asked, “How many experts voted 
in favor of making the recommendation?” and were provided the response options 
of “a. 6 out of 10,” “b. 7 out of 10,” “c. 8 out of 10,” “d. 9 out of 10,” and “e. 10 
out of 10”.   
 Demographic questions. Participants were also asked to report standard 
demographic information including information about the participant’s age, 
gender, and ethnicity.      
Procedure 
 This study was conducted online along with the rest of the PGS 101 
questionnaire using the SONA System, which is routinely used to administer 
studies.  The questionnaire was created using Qualtrics survey software.  
Participants first answered a series of demographic questions.  Then, depending 
on which of four versions of the PGS 101 questionnaire they received, they 
completed one or two short questionnaires for other unrelated psychology studies.  
This took the participants approximately five to ten minutes.  At this point, 
participants started this study by reading the provided directions.  After reading 
the directions, participants from all four version of the PGS 101 questionnaire 
were randomly assigned to one of twenty experimental conditions.  They then 
reviewed the single version of the study materials they received and answered 
each of the measures including: (1) the persuasiveness measures; (2) an 
entitativity measure; (3) a behavioral intentions measure; (4) a measure of 
perceived accuracy of the recommendation; (5) information seeking measures; 
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and (6) a manipulation check.  Following completion of this study, participants 
finished the rest of the PGS 101 questionnaire, were debriefed, and received credit 
for its completion. 
Manipulation Check 
 In order to assess the degree to which the participants paid attention to the 
manipulation of decisional cohesion, a question asked the participant to reproduce 
the level of decisional cohesion they were provided in the vignette.  Of the 
students who completed the study, 68.1% correctly responded to this question.  
To ensure that those who failed to accurately answer the manipulation check 
question had no effect on the results, I duplicated all of the analyses ran on the 
complete set of participants with only the participants who correctly responded to 
the manipulation check question.  The analyses consisting of the 68.1% of 
participants who correctly responded to the question resulted in the same pattern 
of results as when all participants were included.  
 I also ran the analyses including the 80.9% of participants who responded 
to the manipulation check question correctly or within one unit of being correct 
(for example, if they received the manipulation of “9 out of 10” experts agreeing 
and they responded “8 out of 10” then they would be included).  Again, when 
compared to the results which included all participants, these analyses followed 
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RESULTS 
Hypotheses Related Analyses 
 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test the predicted hypotheses.  
The hypotheses were primarily tested using the persuasiveness composite 
measure, although the exploratory analyses—discussed below—include 
additional dependent measures.  For the tables of means for the persuasiveness 
composite measure, see Table 2 and Table 3 and Figure 1 and Figure 2 which 
graph the means.  
 Hypothesis 1: Interaction of framing and decisional cohesion.  Prior to 
testing for a two-way interaction of framing and decisional cohesion, I examined 
the three-way interaction of framing, decisional cohesion, and domain for the 
persuasiveness composite measure.  The three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(4, 1942)= 1.210, p =  .305, see Table 2 and Figure 1.  Since there is 
no observed three-way interaction, I next examined the two-way interactions.   
 My first hypothesis was that there would be an interaction between 
framing and decisional cohesion such that the discounting for the gain framed 
recommendations between high and low decisional cohesion would be 
significantly larger than for the loss framed recommendation.  The analyses 
showed that there was no observed interaction between framing and decisional 
cohesion for the persuasiveness composite measure (F(4, 1942)= .841, p = .499), 
indicating that the participants did not treat decisional cohesion differently based 
on whether the recommendation was framed as a gain or loss, see Table 2 and 
Figure 1.  Prior to moving on to the main effects, I examined the interaction of 
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decisional cohesion and domain and the interaction of framing and domain for the 
persuasiveness composite measure.  No significant effects were present 
(respectively F(4, 1942)= 1.491, p = .202; F(1, 1942)= 1.216, p = .270). 
  As part of the first hypothesis, I also predicted that there would be a main 
effect of framing.  Loss framed recommendations should be more persuasive than 
gain framed recommendations.  In this study, there was no observed main effect 
of framing on the persuasiveness composite measure, F(1, 1942)= .555, p = .457 
(see Table 2 and Figure 1).  Thus, there were no differences observed between 
loss framed and gain framed recommendations.  I will discuss possible reasons for 
not finding an effect of framing in the general discussion section. 
 Hypothesis 2: Main effect of decisional cohesion.  The second 
hypothesis predicted that there would be a main effect of decisional cohesion such 
that when there is more decisional cohesion, for example when 10 out of 10 
experts or 9 out of 10 experts agree, the recommendation should be more 
persuasive than when there is less decisional cohesion.  A main effect of 
decisional cohesion was observed for the persuasiveness composite measure, F(4, 
1942)= 3.441, p = .008, see Table 3 and Figure 2.  To better understand this 
finding I ran a regression analysis to examine the trend.  There was a linear trend 
indicating the higher the decisional cohesion of the expert group making the 
recommendation, the more persuasive the recommendation, β = .039, R2 = .003, p 
= .015.  
 Given that a main effect of decisional cohesion was observed, it is also 
possible that the effect could have something other than a linear relationship.  
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Therefore, I tested whether there was a quadratic effect of the decisional cohesion 
of an expert group on the persuasiveness of their recommendation using a 
regression model that included a variable representing a quadratic effect.  When 
the regression model was tested including the quadratic effect, the quadratic 
variable was non-significant (β = .020, p = .138).  Based on these results, a model 
including only the linear term better fit the data,  β = .039, R2 = .003, p =.015. 
 Hypothesis 3: Main effect of domain.  Although my third hypothesis 
predicted that there would be no effect of domain, there was an observed main 
effect of domain on the persuasiveness composite measure, F(1, 1942)= 25.018, p 
< .001.  Overall, the health domain recommendation (M = 4.47, SD = 0.98) was 
on average more persuasive than the financial domain recommendation (M = 
4.24, SD = 1.05), see Table 3 and Figure 2.  This is consistent with the alternative 
hypothesis that there may be a difference in the persuasiveness of the domains 
because of their relative seriousness.  
 Hypothesis 4: Perceived entitativity as a mediator.  To further explore 
the underlying mechanism driving the effect of decisional cohesion, this study 
included a measure of the perceived entitativity of the expert group making the 
recommendation with the intention of better understanding how entitativity might 
mediate the relationship between the level of decisional cohesion and the 
recommendation’s persuasiveness (see Figure 3).  I conducted a series of 
regression analyses and used the Sobel test to examine the mediation effect.  First, 
I ran a regression and found that the amount of decisional cohesion was 
associated with perceived entitativity, such that the higher the decisional 
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cohesion—the more agreement among the experts—the more entitative the expert 
group making the recommendation seemed, β = .092, R2 = .013, p < .001.  See 
Figure 3b: the mediation path.  A separate regression including only decisional 
cohesion in the model, as shown in Figure 3a, showed that decisional cohesion 
was associated with the persuasiveness composite measure such that the higher 
the decisional cohesion, the more persuasive the recommendation, β = .039, R2 = 
.003, p =.015.  Perceived entitativity was also related to persuasiveness such that 
the higher the perceived entitativity the higher the score on the persuasiveness 
composite measure, β = .394, R2 = .201, p < .001, see Figure 3b.  Finally, when 
the persuasiveness composite measure was regressed on perceived entitativity and 
decisional cohesion, the perceived entitativity was a significant predictor of the 
persuasiveness of the recommendation (β = .393, p < .001) but decisional 
cohesion was not (β = .003, p = .847; overall model R2 = .201, p < .001). 
 This series of analyses shows that decisional cohesion did not remain a 
significant predictor of the persuasiveness of a recommendation when the 
perceived entitativity of the expert group making the recommendation was 
accounted for in the model.  This suggests that the relationship between decisional 
cohesion and the persuasiveness of a recommendation is mediated by perceived 
entitativity and is supported by the Sobel test, z = 4.98, p < .001.  Participants in 
high decisional cohesion conditions perceived the expert group making the 
recommendation as having more entitativity and therefore found the 
recommendation more persuasive.  Similarly, when an expert group making a 
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recommendation is low in decisional cohesion, then that group is perceived as 
having less entitativity and the recommendation is less persuasive. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Behavioral intention measure.  In addition to the persuasiveness 
composite measure, this study also included a measure of the participants’ 
intention to follow the recommendation.  See Table 4 and Table 5 as well as 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 for the tables and graphs of the means.  Like the 
persuasiveness composite measure, there was not a significant three-way 
interaction (F(4, 1931)= .663, p =  .618) nor were any of the two-way interaction 
significant (Frame x Cohesion, F(4, 1931)= .825, p = .509; Domain x Cohesion, 
F(4, 1931)= .639, p = .634; Domain x Frame, F(1, 1931)= .010, p = .920).  In 
addition, there was no main effect of framing (F(1, 1931)= 1.359, p = .244) nor 
decisional cohesion (F(4, 1931)= .839, p = .500).  Thus, none of the hypotheses 
were supported by the behavioral intentions measure.  There was an observed 
significant main effect of domain such that participants had stronger intentions to 
follow the recommendation for the health domain (M = 4.55, SD = 1.57) than the 
financial domain (M = 4.16, SD = 1.53), F(1, 1931)= 28.993, p < .001, see Table 
5 and Figure 5. 
 Information seeking measures.  As an exploratory question, this study 
also measured the participants’ intentions to seek additional information related to 
the recommendation and asked the participants to rate their agreement with four 
reasons why they might seek additional information: (1) he/she wants to “learn 
more about the research behind the recommendation”; (2) he/she “does not trust 
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the recommendation”; (3) “[t]here might be exceptions” to the recommendation 
the participant would want to know about; and (4) “[t]here might be other 
options” the participant would prefer to use. See Table 6 and Table 7 as well as 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 for the tables and graphs of the means. 
 For the information seeking measure, there was not a significant three-way 
interaction (F(4, 1931)= .366, p =  .833) nor were any of the two-way interactions 
significant (Frame x Cohesion, F(4, 1931)= .510, p = .728; Domain x Cohesion, 
F(4, 1931)= .361, p = .836; Domain x Frame, F(1, 1931)= .011, p = .915).  See 
table 6 and Figure 6.  In addition, there was no main effect of domain (F(1, 
1931)= .970, p = .325) nor framing (F(1, 1931)= .050, p = .823).   
There was, however, a marginally significant effect of decisional 
cohesion,  F(4, 1931)= 1.969, p = .097, see table 7 and figure 7.  A regression 
analysis showed that a model including a quadratic term (β = .054, p = .019) best 
fit the data (overall model R2 = .004, p < .028).  Thus, participants were less likely 
to seek additional information when the recommendation was made by 8 out of 10 
experts than when it was made by either 10 out of 10 or 6 out of 10 experts.  It 
could be the case that when the level of decisional cohesion indicates more 
uncertainty, such as when the level of decisional cohesion shows some 
disagreement between the experts but not enough to entirely discredit the 
recommendation, participants are less likely to further inquire about the 
recommendation. 
 I ran a four-way ANOVA to determine if there were any interactions 
among the four different reasons for seeking additional information and the 
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experimental manipulations of decisional cohesion, framing, and domain.  See 
Table 8 for a table of the means and see Figure 8 for a graph of the means of the 
reasons for seeking additional information.  The only significant interaction was 
between the reasons for seeking additional information and the domain of the 
recommendation, F(3, 5757)= 12.631, p < .001.  Simple effects comparisons 
showed that there was no difference between the two domains in the participants’ 
rating of wanting to know more about the research behind the recommendation 
(F(1, 1947)= .975, p = .324).  But for the other three reasons there were observed 
significant differences (lack of trust in the recommendation, F(1, 1950)= 31.197, 
p < .001; wanting to know exceptions, F(1, 1946)= 8.375, p = .004; wanting to 
know other options, F(1, 1944)= 30.070, p < .001).  As shown in Table 8 and 
Figure 8, participants rated higher levels of agreement with lacking trust in the 
recommendation, wanting to know more about exceptions to the recommendation, 
and wanting to know about other options as reasons for seeking more information 
for the financial domain compared to the health domain.  This may suggest that 
the participants were more skeptical of the financial recommendations than the 
health recommendations, thus they were generally more interested in receiving 
additional information about them. 
 I also ran a series of ANOVAs comparing the reasons for information 
seeking within each domain to determine whether a lack of trust in the 
recommendation was an important reason for information seeking compared to 
the others.  This was of theoretical interest because trust is one of the key 
components of the credibility of an expert.  For the health domain, participants 
  38 
rated a lack of trust in the recommendation as significantly less of a reason for 
information seeking than any other reason (wanting to know more about the 
research, F(1, 986)= 325.368, p < .001; wanting to know exceptions, F(1, 986)= 
478.311, p < .001; wanting to know other options, F(1, 983)= 482.769, p < .001).  
For the financial domain, a lack of trust in the recommendation was also the 
lowest rated reason for information seeking, (wanting to know more about the 
research, F(1, 961)= 122.827, p < .001; wanting to know exceptions, F(1, 960)= 
336.438, p < .001; wanting to know other options, F(1, 961)= 587.290, p < .001).  
Thus, it appears that a lack of trust in the recommendation was overall the least 
influential reason for seeking additional information. 
 Perceived accuracy as a mediator.  In addition to testing perceived 
entitativity as a mediator, I also examine whether the perceived accuracy of the 
recommendation mediated the relationship between the decisional cohesion of the 
experts making a recommendation and the persuasiveness of their 
recommendation. Following the same steps as above, I first ran a regression and 
found that the level of decisional cohesion of the expert group was not associated 
with the perceived accuracy of the recommendation, β = .005, R2 = .000, p = .823.  
Since there was no relationship between the decisional cohesion and accuracy, the 
proposed mediator, mediation cannot exist.  Therefore, the perceived accuracy of 
the recommendation did not mediate the relationship between the decisional 
cohesion of the experts and the persuasiveness of the recommendation. 
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DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
 Based on the results of this study, there are a number of significant 
findings.  First, there was a linear main effect of decisional cohesion such that the 
higher the amount of decisional cohesion in an expert group the more persuasive 
their recommendation based on the persuasiveness composite measure.  In 
addition, there was a main effect of domain.  Overall the recommendations for the 
health domain were more persuasive than those for the financial domain.  The 
main effect of domain was also observed in the behavioral intentions measure 
following the same pattern of the health domain recommendation being more 
persuasive than the financial domain recommendation.  Moreover, the analysis 
showed that perceived entitativity mediated the relationship between the 
decisional cohesion of the expert group and the persuasiveness of the 
recommendation.  The higher the decisional cohesion of the expert group, the 
more entitative the participants perceived the group, and the more persuasive the 
participants found the recommendation. 
 Additional exploratory analyses showed a quadratic main effect for the 
information seeking measure.  Participants were more likely to seek additional 
information about the recommendation when it was voted in favor of by 10 out of 
10 or 6 out of 10 experts compared to when it was voted in favor of by 8 out of 10 
experts.  When examining the reasons for seeking additional information, 
participants rated their lack of trust in the recommendation, wanting to know the 
exceptions, and wanting to know alternative option reasons higher for the 
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financial domain compared to the health domain possibly indicating that they 
were less sure of the financial recommendation.  The two domains did not differ 
in terms of how the participants rated wanting to know more about the research as 
a reason for seeking additional information.  Additionally, a lack of trust in the 
recommendation was rated as the least important reason for seeking additional 
information indicating that trusting the recommendation was not a key factor in 
wanting additional information. 
 In conclusion, two hypotheses were supported by the data including the 
predicted main effect of decisional cohesion and the mediation effect of perceived 
entitativity on the relationship between decisional cohesion and the 
recommendation’s persuasiveness.  The predicted interaction of decisional 
cohesion and framing and the predicted main effect of framing were not supported 
by this study.  In addition, there was an observed main effect of domain when I 
predicted that there would be no difference between the domains, therefore that 
hypothesis was not supported, although the results did fit the alternative 
hypothesis and had no effect on the other hypotheses as there were no interactions 
between the domain and any of the other independent variables. 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Implications 
 There are a few possible limitations which may have contributed to the 
unexpected findings.  First, it is possible that the framing manipulation was too 
subtle to produce an effect.  The single statement of a potential gain or potential 
loss may not have been a strong enough manipulation to produce the desired 
effect.  Previous studies where framing effects existed for recommendations have 
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listed multiple outcomes for each frame (e.g., Banks, Salovey, Greener, Rothman, 
Moyer, Beauvais, & Epel, 1995; Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, & Rothman, 
1999; Dijkstra, Rothman, & Pietersma, 2011; Gerend & Cullen, 2008).  For 
example, one study that examined the effect of framing on a recommendation for 
eating more fruits and vegetables listed a number of outcomes which included for 
the gain framed message: (1) better health, (2) improved physical stamina, (3) 
skin looks healthier, (4) hair looks healthier, (5) improved concentration on 
mental tasks, (6) lower blood pressure, (7) lower cholesterol, (8) higher levels of 
vitamins and minerals, and (9) sufficient consumption of essential anti-oxidants 
(Dijkstra, Rothman, & Pietersma, 2011).  Future studies exploring the interaction 
of decisional cohesion and framing could create more elaborate manipulations 
including listing multiple outcomes with the intention of increasing the strength of 
the framing manipulation. 
 Another potential limitation of this study is the content of the actual 
recommendations.  There could be a couple of issues with recommendations 
about consuming sugary beverages and responsible credit card use.  One issue is 
that the participants may be too familiar with the recommendations or view them 
as too obvious causing the experimental manipulations to have a minimized or 
undetectable effect.  This could in part explain why no framing effects were 
observed and why there was a rather small effect size for the observed effect of 
decisional cohesion.  Future studies could use recommendations that are less 
obvious or familiar to the participants.  By doing so, it would likely increase the 
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participants’ reliance on peripheral information, such as the level of decisional 
cohesion or framing, and potentially increase the effect of the manipulations.   
 The results of this study also point to a number of possible, and potentially 
interesting, areas for future research.  Follow-up studies could further explore the 
influence of decisional cohesion.  For example, future studies could present 
decisional cohesion differently to see if the effect persists in alternative 
presentation methods.  Is ‘6 out of 10’ expert agreement the same as ‘60%’ 
agreement or ‘30 out of 50’ expert agreement?  Additionally, future studies could 
examine whether the effect of decisional cohesion is also present in paradigms 
outside of a recommendation.  For example, do the levels of decisional cohesion 
between members of a legislature voting on an issue affect public opinion on the 
outcome of that vote?  Are people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of a court ruling 
dependent on the level of agreement between the judges who made the ruling?  
Future studies could also explore the underlying mechanism creating the influence 
of decisional cohesion on persuasion.  This study examined the mediation effects 
of entitativity but future studies could go farther and explore the effects of 
decisional cohesion on the cognitive processing of the message.  Messages from 
expert groups high in decisional cohesion may be processed more heuristically—
less in depth and using more heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts—than those 
low in decisional cohesion.  This could possibly be explained by the notion that 
when there is high decisional cohesion there is less of a reason to “second guess” 
the group since they are all in agreement.   
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 Additionally, future research could further explore what motivates 
individuals to seek additional information about a recommendation.  In this study, 
there was a quadratic relationship and participants were less likely to seek 
additional information when there was more ambiguity in the level of decisional 
cohesion (when 8 out of 10 experts agreed).  This is an interesting effect worth 
further exploration.  Participants also rated not trusting the recommendation as the 
reason that least drove their information seeking and there was no interaction with 
the level of decisional cohesion.  This finding is interesting because it contradicts 
other research that has focused on the importance of trust on an authority’s 
influential abilities.  Based on this research, I would have predicted that 
information seeking would increase when there is low decisional cohesion 
because of increased distrust of the recommendation, but the results of this study 
do not support this hypothesis.  Future research could explore why trust is not a 
driver of information seeking and try to find the reasons that do drive information 
seeking.   
 Finally, future research should examine whether there are situations in 
which higher levels of decisional cohesion are actually less persuasive.  It is 
possible that when expert groups are perceived as being highly homogenous—as 
having high levels of similarity—then having higher levels of agreement may 
actually make their arguments less persuasive.  For example, it is possible that a 
recommendation made by 10 out of 10 highly conservative republicans may be 
less persuasive than one that is made by 7 out of 10 highly conservative 
republicans especially if the recommendation is related to a politically charged or 
  44 
widely debated topic such as global warming.  In situations where there is a 
highly homogeneous group, individuals may perceive extremely high levels of 
decisional cohesion less favorable because the individual attributes the experts’ 
decision making as being overly influenced by group membership rather than by 
the expert’s thorough scrutiny of the issue.  Thus, when there is high 
homogeneity, high levels of decisional cohesion may evoke perceptions of 
increased group adhesion more than the credibility of the recommendation.  In 
these situations, it is possible that having less agreement, such as 8 out of 10 
experts agreeing, may actually be more persuasive because it will indicate less of 
an emphasis on adhesion to the group.  In this scenario I would also expect 
individuals to be less trusting of the experts and would expect them to be more 
likely to want additional information because of that lack of trust.   
 By including five incremental levels of decisional cohesion I was able to 
verify the optimal level of decisional cohesion and examine the nature of the 
relationship between the different levels of decisional cohesion.  The results of 
this study support the conclusion that higher levels of decisional cohesion are 
more persuasive than lower levels and that the relationship between the levels is 
linear.  In addition, this effect is mediated by the perceived entitativity of the 
expert group.  Thus, the higher the level of decisional cohesion, the more the 
expert group is perceived as having high entitativity and the more persuasive the 
recommendation.  This study helps to build a better understanding of how 
individuals interpret information from experts.  Experts are rarely in complete 
agreement and yet their level agreement is often presented to consumers.  
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Meaning that if policy makers want their recommendations to have the most 
impact they may need to focus resources on identifying and promoting 
recommendations for which there are higher levels of expert agreement.  By 
doing so, their recommendations will likely be more influential.  This study is the 
first of a program of research focused on better understanding the important role 
of experts and groups of experts in individual decisional making.  This and future 
studies will help researchers and policy makers better understand individual 
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Table 1 
Correlations between persuasive, trustworthy, and expertise 
 
Measure 1 2 3 
1. Expertise  _   
2. Trustworthy     .700 _  




















  50 
Table 2 
Table of means for the persuasiveness composite measure broken out by domain, 
framing, and decisional cohesion 
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Table 3 
Table of means for the persuasiveness composite measure broken out by domain 
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Table 4 
Table of means for the behavioral intentions measure broken out by domain, 
framing, and decisional cohesion 
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Table 5 
Table of means for the behavioral intentions measure broken out by domain and 
decisional cohesion (collapsed across framing) with totals 
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Table 6 
Table of means for the information seeking measure broken out by domain, 
framing, and decisional cohesion 
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Table 7 
Table of means for the information seeking measure broken out by domain and 
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Table 8 
Table of means for the information seeking reason measures (Reason1 = “I want 
to learn more about the research behind the recommendation”; Reason2 = “I do 
not trust the recommendation by this organization of experts”; Reason3 = “There 
might be exceptions to the general rule, which I would like to know about”; 
Reason 4 = “There might be other options that I would prefer to use.”) 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
Means for the persuasiveness composite measure by domain and decisional 
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Figure 3 
 
Depiction of entitativity as a mediator 
 













































β = .092, p < .001 β = .394, p < .001 
β1 = .003, p =.847 
Sobel Test, z = 4.98, p < .001 
β = .039, p =.015 
Persuasiveness Decisional  
Cohesion 
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Means for the behavioral intention measure by domain and decisional cohesion 
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Means for the information seeking measure by domain and decisional cohesion 
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Means for Information Seeking Reason measures (Reason1 = “I want to learn 
more about the research behind the recommendation”; Reason2 = “I do not trust 
the recommendation by this organization of experts”; Reason3 = “There might be 
exceptions to the general rule, which I would like to know about”; Reason 4 = 
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APPENDIX A  
STUDY MATERIALS 
 
  66 
Directions: (All Conditions) 
 
Various organizations are frequently making recommendations to the public.  We 
are interested in evaluating your perceptions of these types of recommendations.  
The following provides some information about an organization and its 
recommendation.  Please read the provided information and then answer the 
questions that follow. 
 
 
Scenario 1: Health Recommendation 
 
Expert group information (manipulating decisional cohesion) 
 
An organization of health experts has made a recommendation to the public.  The 
organization set up a panel of 10 experts to review the relevant research on the 
issue and vote in order to determine their recommendations.  The following is 
their current recommendation which 10 out of 10 of the experts voted in favor of: 
 
Other conditions: The passage is the same except the bolded material 
changes to either: 
• which 9 out of 10 
• which 8 out of 10 
• which 7 out of 10 
• which 6 out of 10 
 
 




“Our group of experts recommends reducing your consumption of sugar 
sweetened beverages, such as soda, to maintain a healthy weight.” 
 
Loss Frame 
“Our group of experts recommends reducing your consumption of sugar 
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Scenario 2: Financial Recommendation 
 
Expert group information (manipulating decisional cohesion) 
 
An organization of financial experts has made a recommendation to the public.  
The organization set up a panel of 10 experts to review the relevant research on 
the issue and vote in order to determine their recommendations.  The following is 
their current recommendation which 10 out of 10 of the experts voted in favor of: 
 
Other conditions: The passage is the same except the bolded material 
changes to either: 
• which 9 out of 10 
• which 8 out of 10 
• which 7 out of 10 
• which 6 out of 10 
 
Recommendation (manipulating frame) 
 
Gain Frame  
“Our group of experts recommends that college students acquire one, and only 




“Our group of experts recommends that college students acquire one, and only 
one, national credit card and continually pay the full balance each month to 
prevent bad credit.” 
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APPENDIX B  
STUDY MEASURES 
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Persuasiveness Measures: 
 
1) How persuasive was this recommendation? 
 









































































2) Please indicated your level of agreement with the following statement: The 
group making this recommendation is an expert on the topic.  
 



































































3) Please indicated your level of agreement with the following statement: The 
group making this recommendation is trustworthy.  
 




































































4) To what extent do the experts deciding on the recommendation qualify as a 
cohesive, unified group? 
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Behavioral Intent Measure:  
 
5) How likely are you to start following the recommendation? 
 





















































Additional Exploratory Measures: 
    
6) How accurate do you believe this recommendation is? 
 










































































7) How likely are you to seek additional information about this recommendation? 
 




















































8-11) Please rate the following reasons for why you would seek additional 
information about the recommendation: 
  
 - I want to learn more about the research behind the recommendation. 
 - I do not trust the recommendation by this organization of experts. 
 - There might be exceptions to the general rule, which I would like to    
 know about. 
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 Each of these statements was rated on the following Likert:  
 




































































12) How many experts voted in favor of making the recommendation? 
 a. 6 out of 10 
 b. 7 out of 10 
 c. 8 out of 10 
 d. 9 out of 10 








 14) Gender:   
 
 _____ Male 
 _____ Female 
 
 
15) How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 
 _____ White/Caucasian/European 
 _____ Black/African-American 
 _____ Hispanic/Latino/Chicano 
 _____ Asian-American 
 _____ Native American Indian 
 _____ Middle Eastern 
 _____ East Asian 
 _____ South/South East Asian 
 _____ Multiple Ethnicity 
 _____ Other (Please specify):  ___________________________ 
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This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by 
investigators in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or 
through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information 
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, or be damaging to the 
subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
